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Abstract
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is the run-time environment for
smart contracts and its vulnerabilities may lead to serious problems
to the Ethereum ecology. With lots of techniques being developed
for the validation of smart contracts, the security problems of EVM
have not been well-studied.
In this paper, we propose EVMFuzz, aiming to detect vulner-
abilities of EVMs with differential fuzz testing. The core idea of
EVMFuzz is to continuously generate seed contracts for different
EVMs’ execution, so as to find as many inconsistencies among exe-
cution results as possible, eventually discover vulnerabilities with
output cross-referencing. First, we present the evaluation metric for
the internal inconsistency indicator, such as the opcode sequence
executed and gas used. Then, we construct seed contracts via a
set of predefined mutators and employ dynamic priority sched-
uling algorithm to guide seed contracts selection and maximize
the inconsistency. Finally, we leverage different EVMs as cross-
referencing oracles to avoid manual checking of the execution out-
put. For evaluation, we conducted large-scale mutation on 36,295
real-world smart contracts and generated 253,153 smart contracts.
Among them, 66.2% showed differential performance, including
1,596 variant contracts triggered inconsistent output among EVMs.
Accompanied by manual root cause analysis, we found 5 previously
unknown security bugs in four widely used EVMs, and all had been
included in Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database.
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1 Introduction
Ethereum can be viewed as a transaction-based state machine [37],
whose foundation is transaction execution. There are about 500,000
transactions [15] running on Ethereum every day, most of which
involve the execution of smart contracts. Over the past few years,
the safety and security problems of the blockchain transaction
caused by smart contracts have emerged endlessly. In June 2016,
Blockchain industry’s largest crowdfunding project — TheDAO ,
was attacked due to a serious flaw in splitDAO function, resulting
in more than three million Ether loss [36]. Then, many efforts
are devoted to safeguarding the transaction security by ensuring
rigorous code logic of smart contracts. For instance, Oyente [24] and
MAIAN [29] use symbolic execution techniques to find potential
∗Yu Jiang is the correspondence author.
security vulnerabilities in Solidity smart contracts. Zeus [19] applies
abstract interpretation to analyze smart contracts.
However, as the authentic platform and standard for executing
smart contracts, if there are some vulnerabilities in EVM’s internal
implementation, it will definitely lead to serious consequences such
as Ethereum operation errors or transaction failures. We selected
10 contracts that passed Oyente [24] tool examination and executed
them on EVMs implemented by JavaScript, Python, C++ and Go
language, finding that 7 of them had different gas consumption on
different platforms at the end of execution, and one function even
had the result of execution failure on Py-EVM [12], which is the
Python implementation of the EVM. This shows that only contract
validation cannot ensure the correctness of Ethereum transactions
execution, and it is of great urgency to secure EVM. To perform
efficient EVM testing, we need to solve the following challenges:
• How to define general scenarios and evaluation metrics?
At present, EVM has at least 10 widely used implementations of
different programming language [9], all of which are based on
the standards of Ethereum Yellow Paper [37]. For example, the
amount of EVM code in Geth [10] platform is about 5,475 lines of
Go, accounting for 27.6% of the core infrastructure implementa-
tion of Geth; the data in Parity [11] is about 18,912 lines of Rust,
accounting for 31.7% of the core infrastructure implementation.
The implementation of EVM is complex, involving a large num-
ber of control structures and storage structures. Because of the
EVM version diversity and code complexity, it is necessary to
define meaningful and general evaluation metric for the testing
of different EVMs.
• How to generate test cases that trigger EVM bugs?
The Ethereum Yellow Paper provides the basis for all implemen-
tations of EVM, in which the functions and attributes are defined
by formulas and rules. But there is neither authoritative test
suites and benchmarks nor the common vulnerabilities and de-
fects of EVM platforms sorted out by authority, which makes
EVM testing loses the basis and target of detection. Moreover,
there is no mature testing tool for EVM which makes it difficult
to employ EVM testing on a large scale in the short term. Due
to the lack of official benchmarks and widely used EVM testing
frameworks, we urgently need to find out a solution which is
able to perform efficient and accurate EVM testing, automatically
generating EVM inputs fast and effective.
To address these challenges, we implement EVMFuzz, which
aims to automatically generate adversarial test inputs for EVMs.
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First, we define a general evaluation metric for the differential
fuzzing of EVMs. As most EVMs are implemented as a transaction-
based state machine, and the change of state depends on the opcode
sequence to be executed, the input parameters and gas limit, hence,
we use the opcode sequence executed and gas used as two important
indicators to evaluate EVMs’ performance on each test contract.
EVMFuzz integrates different EVMs and creates a unified running
environment for them. In this way, it takes the natural advantages
of multiple versions to quickly discover the output inconsistencies
without manual checking. Then, our seed contract mutation and
selection algorithms can continuously generate contracts that en-
large the metric difference, so that EVMFuzz can efficiently mine
cases that trigger differential performance of EVMs and try to get
those corner cases with inconsistent execution output.
For evaluation, we firstly conducted empirical studies on 36,295
real-world smart contracts from Etherscan [14] and found that
24,000 contracts triggered metric inconsistencies among differ-
ent EVMs, even with the same execution output. Through guided
fuzzing, 1,596 variant contracts successfully triggered inconsistent
execution output among different EVMs. With manual analysis, we
found 5 previously unknown security bugs in different widely used
EVMs, and all had been included in Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) database [26].
Contributions We make the following main contributions:
• We introduce an evaluation metric for EVM differential fuzzing,
define 8 mutators for seed contract generation and design dy-
namic priority scheduling algorithm for seed contract selection.
• We implement EVMFuzz, an automated differential fuzz testing
framework, to efficiently expose the differences and vulnerabili-
ties of different EVMs.
• We apply EVMFuzz to test some most widely used EVM ver-
sions, many inconsistencies and security bugs are detected, and
5 vulnerabilities have been assigned with unique CVE IDs.
Paper Organization The rest of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 introduces some background and gives a motivating
example. We provide a high-level overview of EVMFuzz in Section
3, and the details implementation are described in Section 4. The
evaluation results are shown in Section 5. Section 6 outlines the
limitations and proposes future directions for improvement. Finally,
we survey related work in Section 7 and conclude in Section 8.
2 Background
2.1 The Ethereum Virtual Machine
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is the heart of the Ethereum,
which is often called the operating system of the Ethereum technol-
ogy and is responsible for the execution and maintenance of smart
contracts. It is the bedrock on which smart contracts are built.
The formal definition of the EVM is specified in the Ethereum
Yellow Paper [37]. EVM is a simple stack-based architecture, whose
word size (size of stack items) is 256-bit. According to the predefined
execution environment and execution steps, such as exception halt-
ing and jump destination validity, it completes the state transition
of each Ethereum block. EVM handles the execution of bytecode
and the calculation of gas consumption. In general, EVM is a pow-
erful, sandboxed virtual stack embedded within each full Ethereum
node, responsible for executing contract bytecode.
In accordance with the standards of Ethereum Yellow Paper,
EVMs have been successfully implemented in various programming
languages including C++, Go and many others [9]. There are tens
of thousands of people doing transactions via the clients based on
these EVM implementations everyday. Therefore, the vulnerability
hidden in any EVM version might result in serious consequences.
2.2 A Motivating Example
To investigate the effectiveness of EVMFuzz, we use a simple exam-
ple presented below. f orTest is a simple contract with a function
Testwhile , whose data structure is awhile loop. When the input pa-
rameter a is less than b, variable x will continually increase. Strictly
speaking, the implementation of Testwhile function has a serious
problem and may not appear in real life, if the input parameter
satisfies the loop condition, it will result in an infinite loop. How-
ever, such contract can pass the check of most existing contract
testing and verification tools, and our experiment proves that it can
trigger different behaviors of multiple EVM implementations and
even cause the denial of service problem.
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2 contract forTest {
3 function TestWhile (uint a, uint b) public {
4 uint x = 1;
5 while (a < b) {
6 x += 1;
7 }
8 }
9 }
We test the contract on three different EVM versions—JavaScript
implementation js-evm [13], Python implementation Py-EVM [12],
and C++ implementation aleth [8]. When the TestWhile function
is called with parameters a = 1, b = 2, js-evm will continually
print trace information, together with the increase of CPU usage
and terminate the operation correctly; Py-EVM will print trace
information and terminate the operation correctly; aleth will not
print trace information, but continue to occupy CPU resources
until the system kills the whole process and crashes. Comparing
the execution results, we find that aleth can neither handle the
extreme situation of infinite loop properly that has no friendly user
interaction or information feedback nor cut the loss in time and
reduce malicious resource occupied, eventually leads to potential
denial of service.
This example shows that some contracts containing corner cases
can trigger the boundary condition of EVM implementations and
expose unexplored defects. But these contracts involving extreme
circumstances are often inconsistent with logic programming rules,
which require artificial construction, in other word, contract mu-
tation. Furthermore, for massive mutated contracts, test oracle is
difficult to artificially define, and some extreme cases are not desig-
nated in EVM design specifications. Therefore, it is an efficient and
effective way to apply differential fuzzing.
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Figure 1: The overview of EVMFuzz consists of seed generationmodule and EVM executionmodule. The seedmodule contains
seed mutation and selection algorithms, and the EVMmodule includes multi-EVM running and comparing mechanism.
3 Approach Overview
In this section, we briefly introduce the workflow of EVMFuzz. Our
goal is to apply differential fuzz testing on EVMs. The concept of dif-
ferential fuzz testing is very simple, that is, to continuously provide
invalid, unexpected or random data as inputs to several programs
with the same functions. These programs are then monitored for
catching "different act" on some inputs, if so, we may find a bug in
some of the programs. In this paper, our test object are the same
functional EVM platforms implemented by different programming
languages, and the test input is the mutated smart contract. An
overview of EVMFuzz is given in Fig. 1, which consists of two major
components, i.e., seed contract generation based on static analysis
and unified EVM execution based on fuzzing loop. We will also
introduce the evaluation metrics for EVM differential fuzzing.
3.1 Seed Contract Generation
The input for the seed generation module is the smart contract
file, and the output is a contract variant whose key property has
been modified by specific mutators. First, we precisely construct
the Critical locations identified Abstract Syntax Tree (CAST) of
the seed contract (§4.1), for facilitating subsequent mutation and
analysis. Then the seed contract will be put into the seed pool.
EVMFuzz will rank the candidate contracts as a prioritized queue
under the guidance of dynamic priority, and the contract in the
first place will be selected as the next subject (§4.2). After choosing
the contract for mutation, EVMFuzz uses 8 predefined mutators
and the combined strategy to guide mutation (§4.3) and obtains the
input for unified EVM execution module. The goal is to generate
contracts that can increase the degree of metric difference and
trigger different execution output.
3.2 Unified EVM Execution
EVM execution module provides a unified runtime environment
for various EVMs (§4.4). After receiving the contract file from the
seed generation module, it compiles the seed into EVM bytecode.
The input parameter is generated according to the data type of the
called function, thus the uniform input for each EVM is obtained.
Then EVMFuzz automatically runs all EVMs, calculates the differ-
ence information according to the test metric, and compares the
execution output results. Finally, according to the seed’s ability to
enhance the degree of metric difference, EVMFuzz decides whether
to put the seed contract into the seed pool where high-quality seeds
preserved (§4.5). Besides, when the execution output is inconsistent,
this module will also record the potential exception for manual root
cause analysis.
3.3 Metrics Formulation
To evaluate the performance of each EVM on the test contract, we
define the metric on two general indicators. As most EVMs are
implemented as a transaction-based state machine, and the change
of state depends on the sequence of opcode to be executed, the
input parameter and gas limit, hence, we use the internal opcode
sequence executed and gas used as the two indicators.
(1) opcode sequence. Opcode is short for operation code, which
is used to describe the part of machine code that performs some
sort of operations in machine language instructions. From the
perspective of computer instruction execution, each function
call is completed by a series of opcode execution. The opcode
sequence clearly shows a complete process of contract opera-
tion, which can be used to check the execution correctness of
each step. For platform i , we define opSeqLen(i,C) as the length
of opcode sequence of i when executing contract C .
(2) gasUsed. дasUsed is the total number of gas consumed by all
operations in a transaction or message. The value of дasUsed
is vitally interrelated with the success of transaction execution,
and is also directly related to the transaction fee that users
ultimately need to pay. Here we use дasUsed(i,C) to represent
total gas consuming of platform i after running contract C .
Based on these two indicators, we further define the evaluation
metric of difference information. When given an input parameter,
the normal execution of a transaction on a dedicated EVM platform
is determined by a confirmed and unique execution sequence, and
the total gas consumption is also calculated. Therefore, we con-
struct an evaluation metric di f f to measure the difference among
different EVMs execution(§4.5). The greater the metric difference,
the higher probability the inconsistent execution output. Execution
output is the return value after all executions, that output(i,C) is
defined as the returns of C’s execution on EVM i . For a function
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call, it is the returned data, and for a transaction, it is the balance.
While the metric defined on the two internal indicators reflects the
implementation and execution difference of different EVMs, the
execution output can intuitively reflect whether those EVMs are
running consistently or correctly.
4 EVMFuzz Design
In this section, we will elaborate on the key components in Fig. 1.
4.1 CAST Construction
Before EVMFuzz starts the entire procedure of fuzzing, it first carries
out static analysis on initial seed contracts and generates the CAST
structure for further mutation.
A CAST of a smart contract is a structured tree representation of
the abstract syntactic structure of Solidity source code. Each node
of the tree denotes a construct occurring in the source code. CAST
can define and decompose properties in all statements of contract.
Transforming a contract into CAST structure can help us complete
the subsequent contract mutation operations. It can directly search,
replace, delete or insert operators according to the key attributes.
Furthermore, CAST identifies critical locations of a seed contract,
which are the subtree of statements related to ether transaction. It
mainly involves six statement symbols — new , call , deleдatecall ,
callcode , send and trans f er . Based on CAST, we can guide pre-
defined mutators to select the structures that are identified as criti-
cal locations in order to test the core functions of EVM. A simple
example is presented in Fig.2, including the source code and the cor-
responding CAST structure, where the shaded nodes are regarded
as the critical locations, for the reason that they are all under the
subtree of the call statement.
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2 contract Demo {
3 function transfer (address from,address caddress,address[] _tos,
uint v) public returns (bool) {
4 require(_tos.length > 0);
5 bytes4 id=bytes4(keccak256(
6 "transferFrom(address,address,uint256)"));
7 for(uint i=0;i<_tos.length;i++) {
8 caddress.call(id,from,_tos[i],v);
9 }
10 return true;
11 }
12 }
Figure 2: CAST structure of Demo contract, and the shaded
nodes are the identified critical locations.
4.2 Seed Contract Prioritization
In seed contract pool, the importance of each candidate contract is
different. In general, the contract that makes the metric difference
among EVMs larger should be the benchmark for the next mutation
iteration. But at the same time, in order to ensure the diversity, other
contracts should also have a certain probability of being selected.
Therefore, we use the dynamic priority scheduling algorithm to
maintain a candidate queue. For each contract, we give it an initial
priority, and then its value changes with the increasing of waiting
time to ensure that every seed has the chance to be selected.
Algorithm 1: Seed Prioritization
Input: candidate_seeds ← list of candidate contracts
di f f _pri ← difference priority of each seed contract
time_pri ← time priority of each seed contract
Output: C ← test contract for next iteration
1 initial priority = {}
2 for i = 0 to len(candidate_seeds) do
3 cur = candidate_seeds[i]
4 priority[cur] = diff_pri[cur] + time_pri[cur]
5 end
6 candidate_seeds.sort(cmp=priority, reverse=True)
7 C = candidate_seeds[0]
8 /* update time priority */
9 for i = 1 to len(candidate_seeds) do
10 time_pri[candidate_seeds[i]] += 1
11 end
Algorithm 2: Contract Mutation
Input: C ← contract before mutation
di f f ← difference information of last time iteration
choice ← selection of combined strategy
mutator_list ← list of mutators
Output: C ′← contract after mutation
1 C_tree = generate_CAST(C)
2 mutator_list.sort(cmp=diff)
3 m = select_mutator(mutator_list, choice)
4 for i = 1 to len(m) do
5 C_tree’ = mutate(C_tree, m[i])
6 end
7 C’ = generate_code(C_tree’)
As Algo. 1 shows, the priority of each seed contract consists of
two parts (Algorithm 1 line 3-4). The first part is metric difference
priority, and the initial value is a number between 0 and 10, which
is proportional to the value of difference; the second part is time
priority, and the initial value is 0. Then, all candidate seed contracts
are sorted according to the priority value, and the contract with the
highest integrated priority is selected as the next mutation object,
and the time priority of other seed contracts is increased for next
iteration (Algorithm 1 line 9-11).
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Table 1: Typical Mutators
Object Description of Mutator Example (contract source code before mutation→ contract source code after mutation)
local variable Select a method andmodify one or morelocal variable attribute(s)
function multiPath (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint)
{ uint x; }
→ function multiPath (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint)
{ bytes x; }
function property Select a method and insert, modify ordelete its function attribute(s)
function multiPath (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint) {...}
→ function multiPath (uint a, uint b) constant returns (uint) {...}
arithmetic operator Select a method andmodify one or moreinner arithmetic operator(s)
function multiPath (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint)
{ uint c = a + b; }
→ function multiPath (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint)
{ uint c = a - b; }
conditional operator Select a method andmodify one or moreinner conditional operator(s)
... if (a > b) { ... } ...
→ ... if (a <= b) { ... } ...
loop operator Select a method andmodify one or moreinner loop execution statement(s)
... for (uint i = 0; i < 100; ++i) { ... }
→ ... for (uint i = 0; i < 199; ++i) { ... }
assert statement Select a method and insert or delete oneor more assert statement(s)
function sub (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint)
{ ... }
→ function sub (uint a, uint b) public returns (uint)
{ ... assert (a > b); ... }
return statement Select a method and delete the returnstatement
function get (uint a) public returns (uint)
{... return a; ...}
→ function get (uint a) public
{ ... }
control structure Select a method and insert continue orbreak statement in loop structure
... for (uint i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { a += b; }
→ for (uint i = 0; i < 10; ++i) { a += b; break; }
4.3 Seed Contract Mutation
The goal of EVMFuzz is to generate high-quality seed contracts that
can trigger more discrepancies among EVMs and to identify vulner-
abilities in EVMs. As Algo. 2 shows, EVMFuzz first generates CAST
from contract’s Solidity code (Algorithm 2 line 1). Then, it updates
the weight of each mutator based on the metric difference feedback
(Algorithm 2 line 2), and selects a combination strategy to mutate
the candidate seed contract with the corresponding mutators (Al-
gorithm 2 line 3-6). Finally, soltar [6] is utilized to reconstruct the
code from CAST (Algorithm 2 line 7). Details about the mutators
and mutation strategies are introduced as below.
Typical Mutators. During mutation, we must ensure the syntax
correctness of the modified contract so that it can generate byte-
code normally. Currently, we design 8 mutators according to the
functional logic features of the smart contract, shown in Table 1.
These variations are based on three different granularity, the first
is word-level (row 2-3), modifying variable and function attributes,
which could influence the storage and syntax structure; the second
is character-level (row 4-6), modifying the arithmetic or conditional
operators and the terminate condition in a loop, which may stochas-
tically change the control flow; and the last is statement-level (row
7-9), like insert or delete some assert statements which are used for
internal condition judgment, etc.
Mutator Selection. Each mutator performs differently, so we
can also maintain a priority queue based on the feedback metric
difference. For a seed contract, we update the weight of correspond-
ing mutators after the multi-version EMVs comparison, which is
similar to the initialization of metric difference priority (§4.2). If
the metric difference increases, the mutator ID is pushed into the
queue in descending order according to the weight; otherwise, the
queue will not update. Except for the weight update, we design five
mutator combined strategies to further increase the randomness
and diversity of mutation in each iteration:
• OddComb: Combination of the mutators whose index is odd.
• EvenComb: Combination of the mutators whose index is even.
• ExtremeComb: Combination of first and last mutator.
• RandomComb: Randomly select a mutator, without weight.
• AllComb: Randomly choose one strategy above in each iteration.
4.4 Unified EVM Execution
After an effective contract mutation, it is necessary to compare
the metric difference of the EVMs’ execution in order to guide the
subsequent mutation and selection of seed contracts. The execution
of different EVMs requires unified management.
The first step is to get the data that can directly feed into EVM
platform, namely the contract bytecode and input parameters. By
executing solc −bin −runtime xx .sol , we can compile the mutated
seed contract C into runtime bytecode. According to the selected
function’s received data type, we can generate the input parameters.
For each data type, we pre-define some common or extreme values,
which are randomly selected at the time of generation. The second
5
step is to call the execution interface of each EVM to execute the
contract data, standardize the output format of the execution result
and save the output. The third step is to analyze the output files of
each platform, comparing the data of each indicator and calculating
the metric difference for next iteration.
4.5 Seed Contract Selection
As mentioned above, we evaluate the quality of a generated seed
contract based on platform diversity, so we select candidate seed C
based on the metric difference di f f , which is defined as follows.
дasDi f f (i, j) = norm(abs(дasUsed(i,C),дasUsed(j,C)))
opDi f f (i, j) = norm(abs(opSeqLen(i,C),opSeqLen(j,C)))
di f f = дasDi f f (i, j) + opDi f f (i, j)
outVul(i, j) = output(i,C) ⊕ output(j,C)
Difference is used to measure the input seed’s ability of inducing
platforms to make differential decisions. If a mutated contract en-
larges the difference after executing on different EVMs, we consider
it to be a high-quality seed with a higher probability of triggering
vulnerabilities and store it in the seed queue as a candidate for the
next iteration of prioritization and mutation (Algorithm 3 line 2-7).
Algorithm 3: Seed Selection
Input: C ′← contract after mutation
record ← maximum difference information recorded
Output: candidate_seeds ← list of candidate contracts
di f f _pri ← difference priority of each seed contract
time_pri ← time priority of each seed contract
1 diff = run(C’)
2 if diff > record then
3 diff_pri[C’] = 10 * normalize(diff)
4 time_pri[C’] = 0
5 candidate_seeds.append(C’)
6 record = diff
7 end
5 Evaluation
In this section, we present the experiment details. EVMFuzz has
conducted large-scale mutations on 36,295 real-world smart con-
tracts and several EVM discrepancies and vulnerabilities have been
found. We answer the following three questions: (i) Is there any
inconsistency among EVMs? (ii) Could EVMFuzz generate
high-quality seed contracts efficiently? (iii) Is it possible to
find EVM bugs through differential fuzz testing?
5.1 Data and Environment Setup
All experiments were performed atop a machine with 8 cores (Intel
i7-7700HQ @3.6GHz), 16GB of memory, and Ubuntu 16.04.4 as the
host operating system. The 36,295 real-world contracts we used
for mutation were crawled from the Etherscan [14] and we ob-
tained the corresponding bytecode and abi function via the Solidity
language compiler solc 0.4.24 [32]. EVMFuzz tested four widely
used EVM platforms for each mutated contract, that is, js-evm [13],
Py-EVM [12], aleth [8] and geth [10]. Considering the fairness, all
platforms were running in the same environment.
All those initial real-world contracts are deployed in the Ethereum
and have different addresses. We first analyzed them in four aspects:
lines of code, functions, all relevant opcodes and some specific op-
codes. More than 6,500 contracts have over 500 lines of code, and 90
of them have more than 2,000 lines of code, which shows that the
target contracts we choose are complicated. Since our experiment is
based on the function level, every specific function in the contract
is of great significance to our work. The total function number
runs up to 1,013,013 and 83% contracts have more than 15 inner
functions, which provides a wide range of space for mutation.
In essence, EVMexecutes opcode sequence rather than the source
code written in high-level languages, whose completeness is closely
related to the ability to handle distinct opcodes. The number of
instructions in a single contract ranges from 32 to 83,329, with
an average of 6,472. In order to ensure the normal execution of
all transactions, each EVM must correctly handle the logic of 140
different instructions. The statistic on the occurrences of 11 repre-
sentative opcodes in each contract is analyzed. The opcodes that
related to stack (like PUSH1, POP, DUP1) or conditional jumps (like
AND, ISZERO, JUMPDEST) have a higher frequency of occurrence,
which has also been considered in the mutators design.
5.2 Is there any inconsistency among EVMs?
From the most intuitive statistics, among those real-world contracts,
34,699 contracts were successfully executed by four platforms and
the execution outputs were the same. Based on these initial con-
tracts, we will elaborate on the metric difference among different
EVMs in the view of the two internal test indicators: дasUsed and
opcode sequence.
5.2.1 gasUsed inconsistency
Within the 34,699 successfully executed contracts, there are
33,424 contracts, which are executed normally with the same op-
code sequence. They are used for дasUsed comparison, which ex-
cludes the inconsistency of gas consumption caused by different
execution opcode sequences. Table 2 is a statistic of the number of
contracts with inconsistencies among different EVMs.
Table 2: gasUsed inconsistency
js-evm Py-EVM aleth geth total percent
js-evm 0 18115 31166 17486 66767 66.59%
Py-EVM 18115 0 31176 1358 50649 50.51%
aleth 31166 31176 0 31163 93505 93.25%
geth 17486 1358 31163 0 50007 49.87%
In the process of contract execution, almost every platform has
over 50% average inconsistency rate of дasUsed with others, and
aleth even produces a different gas consumption over 90% of con-
tracts. There are two reasons for this phenomenon. For one reason,
the дasCost for some same opcodes defined by different EVM plat-
forms is inconsistent. But for the reason that all EVMs are imple-
mented based on the Yellow paper, this situation rarely occurs. For
another, the yellow paper did not specify specific gas consumption
values for some opcodes, such as MSTORE, SLOAD, JUMPDEST.
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(a) js-evm (b) Py-EVM (c) aleth (d) geth
Figure 3: GasUsed inconsistency of different EVM platforms.
Then, different platforms adopt different refund mechanisms, which
also results in the inconsistency.
For further analysis, we calculated the average value of these
33,424 smart contracts as the baseline, then the gas consumption of
each EVM is compared with it, as presented in Fig. 3(a)-(d). From
these figures, js-evm consumed less gas than baseline, while Py-
EVM consumedmore, and geth and aleth consumed almost the same
as average. Based on these observations, developers should pay
attention and set differentдasLimit accordinglywhen deploying the
same contract on different EVMs to ensure the correct transaction.
5.2.2 opcode sequence inconsistency
When analyzing the experimental results, we found that even
the execution outputs of the four EVMs were the same, their op-
code sequences are not completely consistent. In total, 1,275 seed
contracts were successfully executed on four EVM platforms and re-
turn the same output, but the sequence lengths were different. The
inconsistency in sequence length may be due to the fact that each
EVM platform internally optimizes when executing the bytecode.
Table 3: opcode inconsistency
js-evm Py-EVM aleth geth
js-evm 0 1275 52 52
Py-EVM 1275 0 1240 1240
aleth 52 1240 0 0
geth 52 1240 0 0
From Fig. 4, we can see that the sequence length of geth and
aleth on these 1,275 contracts were always the same; the length
of the opcode sequence of js-evm is small and always below the
baseline; but the length of the execution sequence of Py-EVM is
large and always above the baseline. From the perspective of ex-
ecution sequence length, the optimization function of js-evm is
better, which reduces the execution burden of EVM to some extent.
Those optimizations might be integrated into other EVM imple-
mentations. However, considering the following output analysis
results, it is possible that this optimization also leads to a reduction
in the execution robustness.
From the above intuitive statistics, it is reasonable to conclude
that there are inconsistencies among the implementation and exe-
cution of different EVMs, and it is possible to leverage the metric
difference of дasUsed and opcode sequence indicator to guide the
generation of contracts resulting in potential inconsistent execution
output.
5.3 Could EVMFuzz generate high-quality seed
contracts efficiently?
Within three days, based on the crawled real-world initial contracts,
EVMFuzz generated and executed 253,153 non-redundant contracts.
Among them, more than half of the seed contracts (66.2%) success-
fully trigger the differential performance of дasUsed and opcode
sequence indicator, including 1,596 variant contracts showed in-
consistent output results among the four EVM platforms. In the
process of mutation, the generated seed contracts may contain some
rare situations, such as illegal data type or infinite loop, due to the
change of key attribute values. If an EVM platform cannot deal
with these boundary conditions properly, it will not get the correct
output result, and even lead to some serious security problems, as
the motivating example presented in the background.
For those 1,596 inconsistencies of the execution output, we re-
fine two metrics for each EVM — Ind.1 is that only this platform
does not crash and all others crash; Ind.2 is that only this platform
crashes and all others do not crash. Through these two numbers,
we can see each EVM’s ability of keeping good consistency with
others and its robustness. These two numbers indicate inconsisten-
cies and there are definitely some potential defects in either the
crashed platform or the non-crashed platform. Then, we can further
manually analyze the root cause of these potential defects.
Table 4: output inconsistency refinement
js-evm Py-EVM aleth geth
value of Ind.1 131 0 38 0
value of Ind.2 9 14 0 0
total inconsistency 140 14 38 0
Furthermore, to evaluate the efficiency of different mutation
strategies and the quality of each mutator, we selected a contract
and its inner function with the longest lines of code from the
crawled real-world contracts for detail demonstration. This func-
tion receives two parameters and returns auint type, including two
loops and six branch structures. Each branch contains a different
number of conditional judgments, arithmetic operations and assert
statements, which provides a large mutation space.
As mentioned in §4.3, we designed 5 strategies for mutator com-
bination, and their performance statistics are presented in Fig. 6. At
the beginning of mutation, EvenComb strategy had the fastest ris-
ing rate. Within 30 iterations, the metric difference di f f increased
from 346 to 1,840. However, it then had the difficulty in jumping
out of the local optimal solution and grew slowly. After the 80th
iteration, AllComb strategy found a new breakthrough and began to
grow rapidly. Eventually, it got the largest metric difference. It also
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Figure 4: Opcode sequence inconsistency of different EVM platforms.
(a) Mutator #1 (b) Mutator #2 (c) Mutator #3 (d) Mutator #4
(e) Mutator #5 (f) Mutator #6 (g) Mutator #7 (h) Mutator #8
Figure 5: Weight changing of each mutator recorded in each mutation iteration.
Table 5: Final weights of each mutator
Mutator Object Method Weight
#2 conditional operator Modify all conditional operators 0.2703
#3 arithmetic operator Modify all arithmetic operators 0.1691
#5 loop operator Increase the iteration of loop by 99 0.1180
#8 control structure Insert continue or break statement 0.1043
#1 local variable Modify all variable attributes 0.1022
#6 assert statement Delete or insert an assert statement 0.0963
#4 function property Modify all function attributes 0.0765
#7 return statement Delete the return statement 0.0631
shows that the randomly choose different strategies with guiding
information in each iteration can generate high-quality seeds most
efficiently. As for RandomComb strategy without weight guiding
information, which is completely based on randomness, had the
worst performance in rising rate and final value. Those statistics
indicate that the weight information of each mutator has a certain
guiding significance and facilitates the combined mutation strategy.
To investigate the effects of each mutator and the correspond-
ing weight, we analyze the procedure of AllComb strategy in de-
tail. Firstly, we generate a tuple of input parameters based on the
function signature. Then, with the function signature and input
parameters unchanged, different strategies are randomly adopted
to mutate the original contract for 50 iterations. After that, the
feedback metric difference and the corresponding mutator weights
in each iteration are recorded, shown in Fig. 5. The mutator ID
matches the first column of Table 5, which shows the mutator
weights statistics after mutating 36,295 contracts. There are eight
mutators involved, with an average weight of 0.125, so we use this
average value as a baseline to observe whether each mutator plays
a positive or negative role in each iteration of AllComb strategy.
In Fig. 5(b)(c), most regions are concentrated above the baseline,
and the peak value even reaches to 0.6. These two mutators are re-
spectively used for arithmetic operators and conditional operators
modification. For the arithmetic operators, mutator changes the
results of computation and affects the subsequent execution path;
and for the conditional operators, mutator changes the executed
8
Figure 6: Efficiency of different mutation strategies.
module, involves different execution opcodes and causes the in-
creasing of difference. On the contrary, in Fig. 5(g), most areas are
concentrated below the baseline, indicating that this mutator didn’t
play a leading role in most iterations. The reason is that deleting
the return value of a function is an irreversible operator and will
not have effect after one modification. The remaining five mutators’
weights are mainly near the baseline (±0.05). Among them, #1 and
#5 have a higher peak value, which shows that they are easier to
trigger the trend of rising under some corner cases; meanwhile,
#4, #6 and #8 have little influence on the increasing of difference.
From the statistics, it is reasonable to conclude that EVMFuzz could
efficiently generate corner cases to trigger different outputs among
EVMs with guiding information of дasUsed and opcode sequence.
5.4 Is it possible to find EVM bugs through
differential fuzz testing?
We have demonstrated that EVMFuzz can efficiently generate seed
contracts and perform differential fuzz testing to find difference
across different EVM platforms. After discovering thousands of
output inconsistencies, we conducted the manual analysis and tried
to explore the root causes.
We ensured its reproducibility and then carefully reviewed the
source code of EVMs. Finally, we found defects in the EVM plat-
forms, of which, 5 vulnerabilities were registered as Common Vul-
nerabilities and Exposures, numbered as CVE-2018-18920, CVE-
2018-19183, CVE-2018-19184, CVE-2018-19330 and CVE-2019-7710,
shown in Table 6. Except for these 5 EVM vulnerabilities, there
were only 6 existing vulnerabilities associated with EVM among
112,913 CVE entries [27], while smart contract vulnerabilities were
over 500. We select two previous unknown CVE instances for a
specific explanation.
CVE-2018-18920 Case Study. This is a runtime error on Py-
EVM. Fig. 7 shows a contract Origin with one construct function.
Function vm.execute_bytecode in Py-EVM takes contract byte-
code and data as input and executes the bytecode along with the
data. When we used this function to execute the Origin’s bytecode,
with the parameter value, the execution terminated abnormally.
The execution result is shown in Fig. 7. This issue has been in-
cluded in CVE database as CVE-2018-18920, it describes that this
vulnerability would result in an execution failure because of an
invalid opcode, and smart contracts can be executed indefinitely
without gas being paid. Once this vulnerability is exploited, the
attackers can make the Ethereum network abnormally congested
without cost, which will cause the Ethereum ecology to be imbal-
anced.
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.24;
2 contract Origin {
3 address public owner;
4 /**
5 * @dev The Ownable constructor sets the original owner
6 * of the contract to the sender contract.
7 */
8 function Origin() {
9 owner = msg.sender;}
10 }
Invalid opcode execution crash
Figure 7: Invalid execution output of Py-EVM.
CVE-2018-19184 Case Study. This is an execution segmenta-
tion violation that occurred on EVM of Go Ethereum (geth). The
code associated with this vulnerability was in the cmd/evm folder,
where the exception handling mechanism of EVM before geth
v1.8.14 did not cover enough corner cases. Although the problem-
atic code snippet is not the API that directly exposed to the end
users, this problem can be exploited by malicious attackers to cause
the Ethereum platform denial of service.
Segmentation violation error
Figure 8: Segmentation violation error on geth-evm v1.8.13.
6 Discussion
We propose a differential fuzz testing framework and have found
some bugs, but there are still some deficiencies that need to be
improved in our future work.
(1) More mutators design. Considering the correctness of com-
piling and the logical complexity, we designed eight mutators,
whose quantity still needs improving. Currently, we just mod-
ify the key attribute values based on CAST. In the future, we
will make more semantic level mutations based on source code,
such as adding internal function calls or contract inheritance
relations. In the future, we can even automatically generate
contracts for testing, similar to the the C program generation
tool Csmith [38] and the SQL generation tool SQLsmith [20].
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Table 6: Description of 5 high-risk vulnerabilities detected by EVMFuzz
CVE-ID platform version language description created date
CVE-2018-18920 Py-EVM v0.2.0-alpha.33 python
Py-EVM v0.2.0-alpha.33 allows attackers to make a
vm.execute_bytecode call that triggers illegal values
shown in stack.
20181103
CVE-2018-19183 js-evm v2.4.0 JavaScript
ethereumjs-vm 2.4.0 allows attackers to cause a denial
of service (vm.runCode failure and REVERT) via a "code:
Buffer.from(my_code, ’hex’)" attribute.
20181111
CVE-2018-19184 geth v1.8.17 golang
cmd/evm/runner.go in Go Ethereum (aka geth) 1.8.17
allows attackers to cause a denial of service (SEGV) via
crafted bytecode.
20181111
CVE-2018-19330 aleth v1.5.0-alpha.6 cpp ** RESERVED ** Details would be public after the vul-nerability has been repaired to avoid potential attack. 20181117
CVE-2019-7710 aleth v1.5.0-alpha.7 cpp ** RESERVED ** Details would be public after the vul-nerability has been repaired to avoid potential attack. 20190210
(2) More efficient priority scheduling. In order to maintain the
priority queue ofmutator and candidate seeds, we adopt the data
structure of PriorityQueue , which is implemented by heap. The
insertion and deletion operations take the complexity ofΘ(logn),
and the time complexity of sorting isΘ(nlogn). Now, the scale of
mutators is small and the length of candidate seeds is short, so
the time overhead is small, but the storage structure still needs
to be optimized to further improve efficiency. Furthermore, the
mutation priority is now based on the sum of two parts, the first
part is difference priority and the second part is time priority.
We can introduce coefficients a and b to balance these two parts
in the future. For example, the difference priority might account
for more proportion than the time priority.
(3) Support of more EVM implementations. The core idea of
differential testing is testing on at least two objects with the
same functions. Therefore, we analyze the differences in four
EVM platforms: js-evm, Py-EVM, geth and aleth. However, in
the real world, many platforms based on other programming
languages are also widely used, and they may also have some
fatal vulnerabilities in implementation. We will further incor-
porate them into our platform.
(4) More accurate selectionmetrics. In the selection of mutated
seed contracts, we use дasUsed and opcode sequence difference
as the inducer for triggering EVM vulnerabilities. But there
are still some problems, such as insufficient quantity and the
lack of unity for data types, waiting for further improvement.
Furthermore, even for the two difference indicators, we can
also introduce coefficients a and b to balance the дasUsed and
the opcode sequence difference in the future. For example, the
weight of the opcode sequence difference might account more
than that ofдasUsed difference.We can even dynamically adjust
the coefficients during the whole fuzzing stages.
7 Related Work
Fuzzing Technique. Fuzzing is an automatic testing technique
that covers numerous boundary cases using invalid data as applica-
tion input to better ensure the absence of exploitable vulnerabili-
ties [22]. Some popular AFL [39] family tools [2–4, 17, 21, 23, 31, 33,
35, 40] apply various strategies to boost fuzzing process, including
symbolic execution, schedule algorithm and so on. For example,
EnFuzz [4] integrates multiple fuzzing strategies to obtain better
performance and generalization ability than that of any constituent
fuzzer alone. There are also some tools focus on fuzzing in other
domains, for example, QuanFuzz [34] is a search-based test input
generator for the quantum programs.
Differential Testing. Differential testing [25] has been very
successful in uncovering differences between independent imple-
mentations with similar intended functionality. For example, Chen
et. al’s perform differential testing of JVMs using MCMC sampling
for input generation [5]. Differential testing has also been used
for deep learning systems. DeepXplore [30] was presented as the
state-of-the-art white-box differential testing framework for deep
learning systems and first introduce the concept of neuron cov-
erage as a testing metric. DLFuzz [16] extends differential testing
framework for DL systems with the comparisons of multiple similar
inputs, and does not need multiple platforms.
Smart Contract Validation. Smart contracts have been shown
to be exposed to severe vulnerabilities [1, 18], and many efforts have
been devoted to ensure the correctness. Luu et. al [24] designed
Oyente, which builds the control-flow graph from the bytecode
and then performs symbolic execution and checks whether there
exist any vulnerable patterns. Nikolic et. al [29] designed MAIAN
for reasoning about tracing properties to detect vulnerable smart
contracts. It specified three typical smart contracts vulnerabilities
based on trace properties. Zeus [19] is a sound analyzer that trans-
lates smart contracts to the LLVM framework and uses XACML as
a language to write properties.
EVM Semantics Formalization. Semantics formalization on
EVM tries to tackle a complex mix between requirements for high
assurance and a rich adversarial model of Ethereum. KEVM [7] is
the first fully executable formal semantics of EVM, which is created
based on a framework of executable semantics named the K frame-
work. A Lem [28] language based EVM implementation provides
a formal specification of the interface between the smart contract
execution and the execution environment. This EVM definition can
be used to prove invariant and safety properties of smart contracts
deployed on Ethereum.
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Main Difference. Different from the above work, EVMFuzz
mainly focuses on discovering the defects and vulnerabilities in
EVM. In the case that most people are concerned about smart
contracts validation, it is necessary to focus our attention on the
validation of Ethereum infrastructure–EVM. Particularly, EVMFuzz
combines the basic ideas of fuzzing and takes advantage of EVMs’
multi-implementation to quickly find output discrepancies and
reduce manual checks. Within EVMFuzz, we also define the domain
specific EVM test indicators to guide the differential fuzzing process
with different contract mutation and selection strategies.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, We propose EVMFuzz, the first automated differential
fuzz testing framework, to efficiently find vulnerabilities of EVMs
implemented by different programming languages. We introduce
the definition of EVM fuzz testing metrics–дasUsed and opcode
sequence, which measure the internal difference in execution infor-
mation between EVMs. We design 8 mutators for smart contracts,
so that EVMFuzz can generate plenty of seed contracts without
syntax error in a short time. EVMFuzz uses the metric difference
as a guidance for seed contract preserving and employs a dynamic
priority scheduling algorithm for selecting the contract in the next
iteration. We evaluate EVMFuzz based on numerous mutation on
36,295 real-world smart contracts. Among the generated 253,153
smart contracts, more than half successfully showed the differential
performance of дasUsed and opcode indicator, including 1,596 vari-
ant contracts triggered inconsistent output results among the four
EVM platforms. With manual root cause analysis, 5 vulnerabilities
have been assigned with unique CVE IDs. Our future work mainly
includes developing more general smart contract mutators, gen-
erators and priority scheduling algorithms, and conducting more
extensive evaluations on more EVMs.
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